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NATO's Credibility in the
Kosovo War
Sead Osmani

Introduction
Before the conflict started in Kosovo, leaders from the u.s. and North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) explained why they intended to intervene in Kosovo.
They most strongly emphasized the reason as humanitarian intervention. With
research and comparison, I argue that sustaining NATO's credibility was the most
important reason. After the Cold War, Europe autonomously initiated security
projects. The main foreign policy interests of the U.s. and the EU started to diverge.
The differing interests eventually evoked discussions regarding the future of NATO,
with NATO officials offering various reasons for their participation in the Kosovo
War, such as ending violence and repression, and the withdrawal of the military,
police, and paramilitary forces from Kosovo (NATO 2010). Were these goals NATO's
strongest motivation? Because the principal player in the Kosovo War was the
U.s., and because NATO is the instrument through which the u.s. perpetuates its
hegemOnic role in Europe, I will use the official U.S. Department of State document
regarding the Kosovo War to demonstrate that preserving NATO's credibility was
actually the most important reason for the U.s. and NATO to participate in the Kosovo
war. The Department of State official statement on the war in Kosovo outlines three
objectives for u.s. and NATO participation in Kosovo. The first objective is "Averting
a humanitarian catastrophe." I analyze whether Kosovo was the most pressing
humanitarian crisis in which NATO could have intervened and the level of success it
achieved in this effort. NATO did not accomplish this proclaimed goal, because the
goal was actually an excuse to intervene in Kosovo. The second Department of State
objective is "Preserving stability in a key part of Europe." With statements from the
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interested country leaders involved in this objective, I will demonstrate stability was
not truly at risk. The last section will offer my proposed explanation that the u.s. and
NATO intervened in Kosovo to preserve NATO's credibility.

Literature Review
The intervention by NATO has been the subject of a great deal of academic
commentary. NATO did not seek UN Security Council authorization for the attack on
Yugoslavia, and the peculiar nature of the Kosovo conflict has led many scholars to be
divided in their opinions. They can be grouped into two categories: those who write
about NATO's illegitimacy in attacking (Hehir 2009 and Menon 2001) and those who
try to find legitimacy for this attack (Greenwood 2000, Roberts 1999, and Glennon
1999). Scholars of the first category argue U.s'/NATO did not seek UN Security
Council authorization to attack; therefore, the intervention was illegal. These
scholars fail to explain the reason U.S./NATO intervened without authorization.
The second category of scholars argue that while the U.s'/NATO did not have
explicit authorization, through the resolutions written for Yugoslavia, NATO had
implicit authorization from the UN Secretary General. Therefore, it was not necessary
to request further authorization. This plausible explanation essentially justifies a
controversial move. However, the UN Charter explains clearly that it is necessary
to obtain authorization for such moves. Explanations of how NATO avoided getting
explicit authorization for its actions unavoidably hint that NATO had underlying
motives for doing so. Those motivations have yet to be fully explored.
Many justify NATO's intervention citing humanitarian and moral duties, despite
the lack of legitimacy in attacking (Randy 2001, D' Amato 2001 and Simma 1999).
However, these claims can be questioned because NATO's use of force against Serbs
ultimately resulted in as many deaths as had already occurred (Herscher 2010). Others
try to explain that NATO's attack was biased and was driven by other motivations
such as economic interests or on distracting attention from the Lewinski sex scandal
(Cohn 2002 and Bulent 2002). The U.s./NATO attack in Yugoslavia was illegal. In
international law, there is no such thing as a "humanitarian" attack. The U.S. wanted
no international security in Yugoslavia other than NATO, wherein their power is
vested. The most powerful motivation for NATO's intervention in Kosovo was the
Department of State's third stated objective: to preserve NATO's credibility (Ong
2003, Cooper 1999, and Dempsey 1999).

U.S. and NATO Objectives in Kosovo
On 26 March 1999, the Department of State released an official statement entitled
"U.S. and NATO objectives and interests in Kosovo." It declares: "The U.S. and NATO
objectives in Kosovo are to stop the killing and achieve a durable peace that prevents
further repression and provides for democratic self-government for the Kosovar people." After this statement, it is listed that the u.s. had three strong interests at stake
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(U.S. Department of State 1999): 1) Averting a humanitarian catastrophe; 2) Preserving stability in a key part of Europe; and 3) Maintaining the credibility of NATO.
Two days prior to the u.s. Department of State release, President Ointon appeared
on national television and set down similar objectives, adding, "Our mission is clear: to
demonstrate the seriousness of NATO's purpose so that the Serbian leaders understand
the imperative of reversing course" (U.S. Department of State 1999).
Although the first two interests listed in the Department of State statement might
be reasonable justification for entering the Kosovo war, they were not achieved and
were rhetorical rather than authentic. In other words, they look like "pretexts for
U.s. and NATO policy, not motives behind the policy" (Layne 1999). The strongest
motivation was evidently to maintain NATO's credibility at all costs, but the other
reasons were needed to support that objective.

Averting a Humanitarian Catastrophe
Averting a humanitarian catastrophe was the first objective highlighted by the
U.s. Department of State and President Clinton. Rather than achieving the objectives,
the air campaign instead launched the crisis into colossal proportions. According
to James Bovard, a policy advisor to the Future of Freedom Foundation, "The CIA
had warned the Clinton administration that if bombing was initiated, the Serbian
army would greatly accelerate its efforts to expel ethnic Albanians. The White
House disregarded this warning and feigned surprise when mass expulsions began"
(Bovard 2001). Arnold Kanter, former under secretary of state for Political Affairs,
said the u.s. has to "be highly selective and restrictive in our decisions about using
military force in humanitarian interventions, confining ourselves to the most serious
or egregious cases" (Frye 2000). According to Kanter, the u.s. should set a high bar
for its humanitarian intervention before participating in it. If the participation should
be confined to the most serious or egregious cases, then the question naturally arises:
Was Kosovo among the most serious or egregious cases? No atrocity in the world
should be underestimated, and each one needs clear and accurate attention. It is not
my intention to underestimate the Kosovo atrocities induced by Slobodan Milosevic;
I am the first one to condemn them. Nevertheless, it is important to put the Kosovo
War in perspective with other atrocities to understand whether intervention in
Kosovo was truly a humanitarian intervention.

Was Kosovo among the Most "Serious or Egregious Cases"?
Kosovo was not among the most exigent of egregious cases during the 1990s.
Several cases were (and continue to be) worse. The Kurds' situation in Turkey was far
more serious than the Kosovo case. According to a 1994 Human Rights Watch report,
thirty-nine thousand people died in the Kurdish southeast Turkey conflict, with over
half the losses occurring in the previous year. "Two million Kurds had been displaced
during ten years of conflict; 108 villages were depopulated only between 9 May and
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10 July 1994, and in the autumn of 1994 some 137 were demolished" (Human Rights
Watch 1994). In 2009, the pro-Kurdish Democratic Society Party (DTP), which had
twenty-one members in parliament, was closed down by the Constitutional Court.
Turks strove to erase Kurdish culture by using threats of violence to ban Kurdish TV,
radio, and language (Human Rights Watch 2009). Kurds could integrate into Turkish
society only if they renounced any Kurdish identity.
Even though this apparent ethnic cleansing of the Kurds has been going on since
1984 and continues today, the u.S. and NATO have not interven~d to prevent humanitarian catastrophe. If the u.s. and NATO were truly seeking to simply avert a
humanitarian catastrophe, Turkey may have been a better destination than Kosovo.
Table 1: Comparison of Kurdish Crisis to Kosovar Albanian Crisis

Number of deaths

Number of villages,
hamlets, or settlements
partly or completely
destroyed

Number of
people displaced

Kurds in Turkey

39,000

7,932

2,000,000

Albanians in Kosovo
(as of 1998)

2,500

12

250,000

Albanians in Kosovo
(during NATO
action)

10,000

1,400,000

Source: Data adapted from Taft (1998), Bozerslan (2001) and Murphy (2004).

Though the u.S. apparently strove to deter a humanitarian crisis, their intervention
only aggravated the expulsion of Albanians. The estimated number of Kosovar
Albanians driven from their homes by Serb security forces prior to the October 1998
cease-fire is 250,000 (Taft 1998)16 The UN Refugee Agency estimated 100,000 refugees
from a potential conflict in Kosovo, prior to war (UNHCR 2000). The total number
of Kosovar Albanians driven from their homes prior to NATO's intervention was
350,000. On the other hand, the number of Kosovar Albanians expelled from Kosovo
by Serbs (March to June 1999 NATO's air campaign) was 863,000. (OSCE 2010) As the
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe shows in its report "Kosovo /
Kosova As seen, As told" the number of refugees continued to increase through all
seventy-eight days of NATO's air attack. (OSCE 2010).
Most alarmingly, this consequence was not unforeseen. On 27 March, 1999, U.s. /
NATO Commanding General Wesley Clark said it was "entirely predictable" that
Serb terror and violence would intensify after the NATO bombing," but on the same
day State Department spokesperson James Rubin said, "The U.s. is extremely alarmed
by reports of an escalating pattern of Serbian attacks on Kosovo Albanian civilian"
(Oines and Myers 1999).20 General Oark was apparently aware of possible violence
against Kosovar Albanian, but still wanted to attack Yugoslavia. It was estimated the
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NATO attack killed as many people as the Serbian attack did prior to the air strike
(Herscher 2010)21 This fact alone shows that preventing humanitarian catastrophe
was not the primary motivation.

Avoiding Humanitarian Catastrophe without Diplomacy while conceding to
Deal with Terrorist.
The UN Charter states that a member of the UN shall, first of all, seek a solution
by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement,
resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own
choice" (UN 1945).22 The u.s. did not do what the Charter preSCribes in order to avoid
humanitarian catastrophe.
If the u.s. was purely motivated by preventing humanitarian catastrophe it
would have also tried to stop the KLA, which functioned on the Albanian side.
Before the Rambouillet Peace Accords, Ambassador Holbrooke, at that time assistant secretary for European and Canadian Affairs, was sent by President Clinton in
October 1998 to seek a cease-fire in Kosovo and allow an international mission to
supervise the troop pullback (Crawford 2002)23 Many Western officials would later
accuse Milosevic of undermining the agreement, but these accusations were not
accurate (Solana 1999). General Naumann, former Chairman of the NATO Military
Committee in the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia said,
"The Yugoslav authorities honored the [Holbrooke] agreement" (ICTY 2002 25 recognizing only the Serbian side. Because of this agreement, the KLA used the Serbian
restraint as an opportunity to launch a new offensive. However, the KLA rejected
the agreement and it met no demands at all, and as General Naumann witnessed,
"the majority of violations [of the Holbrooke agreement] was caused by the KLA"
(ICTY 2002)26
Ignoring KLA caused more problems. George Robertson, former Secretary
of Defense in the Blair government, said in the Examination Witness of the UK
Parliament, "Up until Racak earlier this year [1999] the KLA were responSible for
more deaths in Kosovo than the Yugoslav authorities had been" (UK Parliament
1999)27 The U.S. and NATO did not intervene. They asked Albanis for a ceasefire but
nothing else. If they had intervened, the war in Kosovo would have taken another
path, perhaps a diplomatic one without NATO's attack
Barton Gellman reported in the Washington Post: "U.S. intelligence reported almost
immediately that the KLA intended to draw NATO into its fight for independence by
provoking Serb forces into further atrocities" (Gellman 1999)28 KLA leader, Hasim
Thaci, knew every time they provoked Serbs there would be a counterattack against
civilians, but he and other KLA leaders were willing to let many Kosovar Albanians
die (Little 2010).29 NATO would have been more eager to stop the KLA if they were
truly motivated by humanitarian motives.
U
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The KLA offensive increased and goaded the Serb forces to react to the offensive.
With that reaction, Western officials did not have trust in Serb officials, but on
the other hand, they did not do anything to stop the KLA offensive; instead they
helped the KLA. The London Sunday Times reported: "American intelligence agents
[associated with the OSCE mission] have admitted they helped to train the Kosovo
Liberation Army before NATO's numbing of Yugoslavia" (Walker and Aidan 2000)30
The US. was indeed sympathizing with the KLA. Alan Little, a BBC journalist, asked
Madeleine Albright, "[If] there was no clear mechanism to punish !the KLA] if they
failed to behave in what you call a reasonable way?" Albright answered, "Well, I
think the punishment was that they would lose completely the backing of the US.
and the Contact Group" (Little 2010)31 This statement suggests the US. was actually
supporting the KLA. In fact, the KLA received American intelligence support prior
to NATO's air strike (Walker and Aidan 2000). This assistance seems especially
duplicitous when KLA was recognized as a terrorist group by the US. itself (Bissett
2001).33 BBC News reported on 28 June 1998 that Robert Gelbard, US. Special envoy
for Kosovo, condemned KLA by saying, "I know a terrorist when I see one and these
men are terrorists" (BBC 1998).34 This statement was made prior to the Holbrooke
agreement, which was made in October 1998. Not only U.S. officials recognized KLA
as a terrorist group, but other members of NATO also did, such as Lord Ashdown,
Leader of the Liberal Democrats in the UK and later High Representative for Bosnia
and Herzegovina. In early 1998, the U.S. Department of State listed the Kosovo
Liberation Army as a terrorist group, but then in 1999 the U.S. and the Contact Group
dealt with the organization (Bissett 2001)35 It is clear the US. changed its position
toward KLA and its activities in order to attack Milosevic. Their willingness to deal
with terrorists shows their desperation to attack Milosevic and also to have the
opportunity to use NATO's power in order to preserve NATO's credibility, and also
shows their lack of a desire to avoid a humanitarian catastrophe.

Rambouillet Peace Accord without Real Diplomacy
Diplomatic approaches were lacking during the Rambouillet Peace Accords for
Kosovo, which can be called the" do what we tell you to do" accords. On that occasion,
the US. wanted only to command, to dictate the solution without compromising.
Their attitude and their firmness strongly implied the real issue was not to try
and avoid humanitarian catastrophe but something else. Even though the Clinton
administration was firmly convinced it was possible to solve the Kosovo problem
with an open and unconditional dialogue, the Rambouillet Peace Accord showed
the dialogue was unilateral, closed, and conditional. Albright arrived at Rambouillet
unwilling to have diplomacy without threat of force against Yugoslavia (Little 2010).36
On this occasion U.S. diplomats showed no skill and no desire to solve the problem
with peaceful diplomacy.
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According to Albright and James Rubin, it was necessary on that occasion
to have a clear-cut u.s. and NATO position. There was no real desire to seek an
agreement, because U.s. officials did not believe it was possible to find one with Serbs
(Little 2010).37 In the "Kosovo Report" the Independent International Commission
on Kosovo writes, "Albright and others had been so firm about the supremacy of
NATO over any other institutional actor in this context, and so many aspects of the
Rambouillet process had been presented as explicitly non-negotiable, that there
was little reason for Serbia to have expected flexibility from NATO. If a deal were
possible, it would have had to have been initiated by NATO powers" (Oxford 2000).38
Albright's determination that NATO was the only solution for Kosovo shows the
problem was not avoiding humanitarian catastrophe but establishing the supremacy
and credibility of NATO. The events in Kosovo happened at the right time and the
right place.
The lack of diplomacy and the pretenses to use NATO were clear in Annex B
of the Rambouillet Peace Accord. Toward the end of the meetings, the Serbian
delegation accepted the political aspects of the accord. Christopher Hill, former
ambassador to Macedonia, said Milosevic was open to the political deal offered in
Rambouillet (Oxford 2000). The biggest problem the Yugoslavian delegation found
was in Annex B: Status of Multi-National Military Implementation force. In this
annex, it is stated that a NATO peacekeeping force would occupy Kosovo, as well
as Yugoslavia if necessary. It is obvious the Serbian delegation would not accept
this part of the agreement, because it violated the principle of sovereignty. Henry
Kissinger said, "The Rambouillet text, which called on Serbia to admit NATO troops
throughout Yugoslavia, was a provocation, an excuse to start bombing. Rambouillet
is not a document that an angelic Serb could have accepted. It was a terrible
diplomatic document that should never have been presented in that form" (Kissinger
1999). Before a definitive "no" from the Serbs, there were signs they might accept
international peacekeepers, like OSCE or UN, but not under NATO (Rendell 1999).4
U.s. diplomats refused that idea. In a CNN interview, Albright said, "There is no
question that the basis of the deal is a NATO-led force" (Albright 1999). Since the
u.s. did not want other international peacekeepers, it did not sincerely intend to find
a peaceful solutio~. In fact, a u.s. official told the press the u.s. intentionally set the
bar high in order for the Serbs to comply. Lord John Gilbert, UK Minister of State for
Defense Procurement, in an "examination of witness" declared "I think the terms put
to Milosevic at Rambouillet were absolutely intolerable; how could he possibly accept
them; it was quite deliberate" (UK Parliament 2000).
Even though the Rambouillet agreement did not introduce a referendum for an
independent Kosovo-which the KLA leaders wanted and is the reason they did not
at first accept the agreement-at the end, the Albanian delegation did sign the peace
accord, leaving Serbs alone. Signing was a simple tactic the KLA used because it was
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easier for them to let NATO have a war with Serbia than for the KLA to have a war with
Serbia. This tactic was, in some ways, suggested by Albright. Veton Surroi, Kosovo
Albanian Political Leader said that Albright was very clear with Hashim Thaci, KLA
leader. He reported: "She was saying you sign, the Serbs don't sign, we bomb. You
sign, the Serbs sign, you have NATO in. So it's up to you to say. You don't sign,
the Serbs don't sign, we forget about the subject" (Little 2010). It was intentionally
calculated by u.s. diplomats to put NATO in Yugoslavia. Diplomacy was not present
in Rambouillet, because the two interested parties were never together to discuss
the issues, but discussion happened separately and through letters (Auerswald and
Auerswald 2000).
In brief, the humanitarian catastrophe was not avoided and as the British
committee on Foreign Affairs said: "We accept the view of expert witnesses that the
North Atlantic Treaty gives NATO no authority to act for humanitarian purposes,
and we recommend that the government examine whether any new legal instrument
is necessary to allow NATO to take action in future in the same manner as it did
in Kosovo" (Select Committee on Foreign Affaires 2000). NATO did not have any
authority to act because there is no "right" of humanitarian intervention that could be
found in the UN Charter or in the international law. Even the u.s. rejected supporting
the doctrine of humanitarian intervention (Chesterman 2001). The only convincing
purpose for the intervention is for NATO's own credibility.

Preserving Stability in a Key Part of Europe
The second objective President Clinton, his administration, and NATO suggested was preserving stability in a key part of Europe. According to them, the ethnic
cleansing would cause many Kosovar Albanians to leave their country. Neighboring
countries did not want refugees, because they would create tensions and ultimately
destabilization in Europe. This objective might be important, and it is not possible to
say with firmness the Kosovo War could not destabilize that part of Europe; nevertheless, it is possible to say it was not likely to happen because Macedonia, Albania,
and Montenegro accepted all the Kosovo refugees. The only concern these countries
had was receiving enough international aid for the refugees. The coming of those
refugees was relatively organized and under control (CNN 1999).
In his address to the American people, President Clinton said, "Let a fire burn
here in this area, and the flames will spread. Eventually, key u.s. allies could be
drawn into the conflict." According to the Congressional Research Service, the allies
President Clinton was referring to are Greece and Turkey (Migdalovitz 1999).

Greece and Turkey's Reactions
The Greek prime minister was at first opposed to NATO's intervention in Kosovo
without the UN mandate but later passively accepted NATO, even though Greece did
not participate in military operations (Migdalovitz 1999). In response to President
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Clinton's statement regarding a possible conflict in the region, the prime minister
"disagreed ... that this development could lead to conflict with Turkey," and said,
"Greece ... is a stabilizing force in the area. There is no reason for anyone to fear that
there will be implications with Turkey" (Migdalovitz 1999, 4). It is clear the Greek
political leaders did not agree with President Clinton's statement. Greece did not
recognize any possible destabilization of the region.
Turkish political leaders also differed with President Clinton's statement. The
Turkish foreign minister said, "A state of war between Turkey and Greece due to
the Kosovo crisis is possible only if Greece supports Serbia by leaving NATO and
fights NATO. And I don't expect that such a situation will happen." The Turkish
leaders equally refused to believe that the Kosovo War would have implications
with Turkey and the Kurds in the southeast Turkish region (Migdalovitz 1999, 5).
In brief, President Clinton's statement regarding the destabilization of a certain
part of Europe does not rely on any great support. Turkish and Greek political leaders
assured the destabilization in that part of Europe was almost impossible; therefore,
destabilization was not a valid concern, even if it was possible. History agreed with
Turkey and Greece.

Proposed Explanation: NATO's Credibility
My proposed explanation for U.S./NATO participation in the Kosovo war is that
NATO's credibility was at stake. In order to explain why this proposed explanation is
the most credible, it is necessary to give a short background of NATO and EU history.
NATO History in Context

During the Cold War era, Europe's predominant defense force was NATO, which
was mostly the u.S. with its powerful nuclear capabilities. Europe needed the U.s.,
and this need made the u.s. a dominant power in Europe. As Theodore Draper points
out, NATO was an arrangement, not an alliance: "It was, in effect, a unilateral U.S.
guarantee of European security, because only the U.s. was able to defend itself and
any of the members" (Draper 1983). But with the end of the Cold War, NATO became
a very strange institution without any obvious purpose.
Throughout the 1990s, u.s. policymakers wrestled with the problem of reinventing
NATO, particularly the redefinition of both its purpose and its membership. In the
meantime, Europe started to think about its own defense and security projects,
which made the u.s. uncomfortable. In April 1990, President Bush wrote to France's
President Mitterrand: "NATO is the only plausible justification in my country for the
American military presence in Europe. If NATO is allowed to wither because it has no
meaningful political place in the new Europe, the basis for a long-term U.s. military
commitment can die with it" (Sarotte 2010). As President Bush said, NATO's living
purpose is being present in Europe to defend Western Europe, but Europe started to
see NATO's purpose as no longer necessary in the new Europe. U.s. political leaders
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understood NATO was entering a crisis. In November 1991, NATO held a summit in
Rome, after the London meeting of 1990, to find a better reason for NATO's existence,
and to "transform the Atlantic Alliance to reflect the new, more promising era in
Europe" (NATO 1991). NATO would have a different function from its role in the
Cold War.
EU History in Context
On 7 February 1992, twelve European countries signed the treaty on the EU, also
known as "The Maastricht Treaty," in which these countries undertook to implement
a "common foreign and security policy, including the eventual framing of a common
defense policy, which might in time lead to a common defense, thereby reinforcing
the European identity and its independence in order to promote peace, security and
progress in Europe and in the world" (EU 2010). This event is significant because
it was the first time an official document talks about a common European defense.
Fearing a possible failure of their organization, NATO leadership organized a meeting
in Berlin with the foreign ministers and representatives of the member countries of
the North Atlantic Cooperation Council. In this meeting, it was decided the Western
EU would oversee the creation of a European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI)
within NATO structures «North Atlantic Council 1996). This creation was necessary
to avoid a possible independent European defense that would "destroy" NATO.
Nevertheless, on 2 October 1997 the European Community signed the Treaty of
Amsterdam. Through this treaty, they created the High Representative for the
Common Foreign and Security Policy, and they initiated the European Security and
Defense Policy (ESDP), now known as Common Security and Defense Policy (Treaty
of Amsterdam 1997). The next year at the 1998 Saint-Malo summit, there was a joint
declaration between France and the UK on European defense. An important passage
of the declaration stated: "The Union must have the capacity for autonomous action,
backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness
to do so, in order to respond to international crises." (Foreign and Commonwealth
Office 1998). This statement declared the ESDP road map clearly does not include
NATO but instead a separate and autonomous defense force.
The Clinton Administration started to become nervous about Europe's steps
on defense. In fact, Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott said, "We would not
want to see an ESDI that comes into being first within NATO, but then grows out
of NATO and finally grows away from NATO, since that would lead to an ESDI
that initially duplicates NATO but that could eventually compete with NATO"
(Howerth and Keeler 2003). Clearly, the u.s. did not want any competition for
NATO. Even though EU members did not explicitly want to weaken NATO, none
could really foretell what the future would hold or what would be the eventual
nature of the Atlantic Alliance. The U.S. did not want, and still does not want,
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to accept this outcome, because NATO's presence in Europe means the u.s. will
continue to have a strong influence in Europe, and it will continue to exercise its
military hegemony there. The u.s. has done everything to preserve its power by
demonstrating NATO's necessity and credibility. NATO's credibility was at stake as
it approached its fiftieth birthday.

Kosovo War
The Kosovo conflict was a perfect opportunity for the U.S. and NATO to display
their power and influence. After the war in Bosnia, and prior to NATO's fiftieth
anniversary, it was necessary to show NATO needed to exist and Europe could do
without the Atlantic Alliance. MiloseviC's ethnic cleansing in Kosovo was the perfect
opportunity to exercise NATO's power and to strengthen the u.s: hegemony in
Europe. Kosovo was to be a new sort of war, one fought in the name of universal
values and prinCiples, rather than for narrow interests. In all the Yugoslavia conflict,
but especially in Kosovo, the Europeans wanted to take the lead with diplomatic
means, but the u.s. acceded, because if the Europeans had to work through diplomacy,
it would mean NATO had to be sidetracked; and if NATO led, it would provide a
central role for the u.S. and NATO (Hyland 1999).
The U.s. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright was the biggest NATO supporter.
Albright started to talk about bombing Yugoslavia from the beginning. This bombing
had to be under NATO (Albright 2003). In order to have a NATO attack, the alliance had to have a legal right to intervene unilaterally in Kosovo. Unfortunately, the
alliance did not have that legal right, because it would violate the UN Charter. The
British Foreign Minister Robin Cook wanted UN Security Council authorization, but
Albright stopped him, saying in a phone conversation with him, "If a UN resolution passed, we would have set a precedent that NATO required Security Council
authorization before it could act" (O'Connell 2000, 384). It was not possible to ask for
UN approval, because the U.S. did not want to validate the principle that the Security Council held an effective veto over NATO decisions, a position Congress would
never accept. Therefore, the motive was used of avoiding a humanitarian catastrophe
in Kosovo: a justification for NATO's action.
Right before the air attack, the Clinton Administration and NATO officers
campaigned strongly for NATO's intervention. Albright, together with Holbrooke,
argued with the members of the Alliance that an agreement for peace was achievable
only if NATO authorized the use of force (Albright 2003), otherwise there would be
no other occasion where NATO could show its power and, therefore, its necessity
in Europe. The former secretary alone said the Kosovo situation was a "key test of
American leadership and of the relevance and effectiveness of NATO" (Albright 2003,
391).6 Milosevic's ethnic cleansing carne at the right moment for the U.S., and they
used it to show NATO's credibility.
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If Milosevic was the only problem, and if it was necessary to remove him from
office, the u.s. could have done it. Michael Dobbs, Washington Post foreign service
journalist, wrote an article explaining that American pollster Doug Schoen helped
MiloseviC's opposition overthrow him. Dobbs wrote: "The lead role was taken by
the state department and the u.s. Agency for International Development, the government's foreign assistance agency, which channeled the funds through commercial contractors and nonprofit groups such as NDI and its Republican counterpart,
the International Republican Institute (IRI)" (Dobbs 2000).6 U.S. officers often met
Milosevic opposition in Hungary for various seminars and helped it financially. In
this way, Milosevic was overthrown. Now the question naturally arises: Could the
u.s. not do the same thing in the elections prior to the NATO attack? The answer is,
yes. The demonstrations in 1996-97 showed Serbians were tired of Milosevic. Unfortunately, the U.S. had another plan in mind, which involved NATO's credibility.
Many scholars have discussed NATO's possible failure: "If NATO cannot meet
this challenge and defeat it, why does the alliance still exist?" "NATO will be sunk if
it loses." Any retreat "would be a deadly blow to NATO" (Bandow 1999, 81). The fear
of failing and losing credibility was high.
NATO's credibility prevailed over avoiding humanitarian catastrophe and destabilization of a part of Europe. The British House of Commons Select Committee on
Foreign Affairs wrote in its report on Kosovo that: "Carl Bildt [former High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina] is reported as having been told by White House
staff ten days before the bombing started that NATO needed to launch air strikes in
order to save its credibility" (House of Commons 1999). This is further evidence of the
real objective the u.s. and NATO had in mind.
After eleven weeks of continual bombing, Milosevic agreed to a peace plan. In
that agreement, the sovereignty of Yugoslavia was recognized, the presence of the
UN was confirmed, and NATO and UN presence was finalized just on Kosovo territory. This is the agreement Yugoslavia's government almost accepted in Rambouillet
(Bilder 1999). If U.s./NATO accepted the agreement after the air strike, they could
have accepted it before the air strike, unless this tactic was planned in order to win
against Milosevic and to show NATO's credibility and power.
After the retreat of Serbs from Kosovo, the KLA started its own revenge against
Serbs. Many atrocities during that year happened when NATO-led KFOR was responsible for security in Kosovo (King and Mason 2006, 53). All told, almost a quarter of a
million people fled Kosovo during the period after the war ended (BBC 2003). Nevertheless, the media and the international community did not emphasize the problem in
the same way they emphasized the Serbs' attack against Kosovar Albanians.
NATO's intervention was seen as a triumph. It had to be that way to show
NATO's credibility and necessity even more. The U.S. reaffirmed U.s. hegemony and
set a precedent that NATO could go to war virtually whenever it wished, without
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the authorization of the UN Security Council. The U.S: dominance over Europe was
preserved. The main benefit of the Kosovo War for the u.s. was the reestablishment
of the key institution of U.s. hegemony in Europe: NATO.
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